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ABSTRACT
With fixed costs of developing technology, taxes can generate large efficiency costs by slowing the
rate of diffusion and these costs are not accounted for in conventional analyses. This paper illustrates
this by analyzing the impact that taxes would have had on broadband Internet access at an early stage
of its diffusion around the country, combining data on individual demand by area with data on
supplier entry in those markets. Applying a tax to broadband in 1998 would have reduced the
quantity and generate a large deadweight loss in the conventional model but when the analysis
accounts for the fixed costs of entering new markets, taxes would have also delayed entry in several
markets. In these places, the lost consumer surplus from delay is an additional deadweight loss and
it more than doubles the estimated efficiency costs of taxation. The conventional model also
dramatically understates the share of tax burden that would have been borne by customers.
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  Despite a growing literature dealing with the importance of new goods, there has been little 
analysis of the whether the continued introduction of new goods has any implications for tax policy.
1  
This paper shows that the impact of taxes on technology diffusion has the potential to be quite 
significant if there are fixed costs associated with introducing the new goods.  Using, as a practical 
example, data on the market for broadband Internet access when it first began to spread widely, the 
results suggest that the true deadweight cost of taxation can be several times larger and the incidence 
born much more by consumers than indicated by a traditional tax analysis. 
  The case of taxes and broadband is interesting in its own right, as well.  Considerable debate 
arose over the Internet Tax Freedom Act and its subsequent extensions which placed a moratorium on 
state taxation of Internet access.  Legislation currently before Congress would permanently ban taxes 
on internet access.  The states have opposed these measures, realizing the large revenue potential of 
such taxation.
2  On top of that, there is considerable interest on the part of policy makers and the 
general public in the spread of broadband and the existence of a "broadband gap" between the U.S. 
and countries thought to be farther along the technology frontier, as well as concern about a "digital 
divide" separating rich, urban people from their poorer and more rural counterparts in their use of 
advanced technology.
3  Though the market was decidedly different in the early years of broadband 
than it is now, many of the same issues that faced larger markets then may apply in smaller markets 
                                                 
1  The recent work in Industrial Organization is discussed in Trajtenberg (1989), Bresnahan and Gordon (1997), 
Hausman (1999), Petrin (2002), Nevo (2003) and Goolsbee and Petrin (2004).  There are a few examples of 
work on tariffs and new goods (Romer, 1994; Feenstra, 1995; Klenow and Rodriguez-Claire, 1997) and papers 
on the welfare costs of regulatory delay such as Hausman (1997; 1998).  
2 Goolsbee (2001) points out that the potential revenue from applying sales tax to Internet access probably 
exceeds the entire revenue loss from not enforcing sales taxes on Internet purchases.  Mazerov (2003) 
summarizes the states' position opposing the ban on access taxes because it will deny them considerable 
revenues.  
3 Popular discussion of the 'broadband gap' can be found in Bleha (2005) or Rosenbush et al. (2004).  Academic 
work on the spread of Internet access and the 'digital divide' include Downes and Greenstein (1998), Hoffman 
and Novak (1999), Compaine (2001), and Goolsbee and Guryan (2006).  There has been work on how people’s 
use of the Internet responds to prices (see, for example, Varian, 1999, Beckart 1999, the discussions in Mackie-
Mason and Varian, 1995 or the papers in McKnight and Bailey, 1997).  This literature has become less relevant 
for analyzing taxes on access, however, since most Internet Service Providers (ISPs) currently charge a flat 
monthly fee for unlimited use.  Bruce et al. (2004) examine the impact of taxes on overall Internet access rates today.  
  The paper will use data on individual level demand for broadband across locations to 
construct market specific demand curves and use them to do an analysis of broadband taxation.  The 
results suggest that at the time of the survey (late 1998/early 1999), the consumer surplus from 
broadband was about $667 million per year in markets where it was available and that the demand 
was highly elastic.  As a result, the deadweight loss from taxing broadband in 1998, as computed in a 
standard analysis, would have been quite high, at almost 200% of the revenue such a tax would have 
generated.  The tax would have been borne about 55% by consumers.  
Looking deeper, however, the paper is able to use the computed producer surplus in each 
market to estimate the implied size of the fixed costs of entering a new market (or at least of entering 
on the more limited scale that characterized entry at that time).  It then shows that in several medium 
sized markets, applying a tax on broadband would have reduced the potential producer surplus enough 
that suppliers would not be able to cover their fixed costs and would choose to delay the diffusion of 
broadband in those markets.  By doing so, however, the tax would have eliminated the entire potential 
consumer surplus from those markets (as well as the firm profits) in the interim.  Those losses are 
pure deadweight loss (DWL) and are large.  Taking account of the impact of taxes on the spread of 
the new technology more than doubles the estimated DWL from the tax as compared to the standard 
model.  The incidence of the tax is also substantially more heavily born by the consumer than in the 
conventional calculation.   
  The paper proceeds in six sections.  Section 2 presents an overview of the theory behind 
evaluating taxes on new technologies.  Section 3 describes the industry and the data and estimates the 
demand curves.  Section 4 presents a conventional tax analysis.  Section 5 then estimates the fixed 
costs of entry into new markets and adds an analysis of how taxes affect diffusion in this market and 
the ways that changes the main tax results.  Section 6 concludes.  
                                                                                                                                                         
and find no effect.  Likewise, Goolsbee (2000) finds no significant impact of sales taxes on access.  Both of these  
2. Theory  
The basic idea of why taxes might have a different impact when there are new goods rests on 
the existence of fixed costs and follows on the insight of Romer (1994) that tariffs can have large 
negative welfare effects if they lead to fewer goods being imported into a small country.  
Consider the market for broadband where the supplier has market power as in Figure 1.
4  In a 
conventional analysis of taxes in such a market, imposing a tax will reduce the quantity and create a 
deadweight loss that depends on the elasticity of demand (see Sumner, 1981 for a traditional 
exposition).  Without taxes, the supplier sets marginal revenue equal to marginal cost and produces Q0 
which it sells to consumers at P0. A per-unit tax on the seller, this raises the marginal cost curve to the 
dashed line in the figure.  The after tax price to the buyer rises to PT and the quantity falls to QT.  The 
government raises revenue equal to area D from this tax.  The consumer surplus after the tax falls 
from A+B+E to just A.  The producer surplus goes from C+D+F+G to B+C.  The DWL of the tax is 
the entire area of lost consumer and producer surplus, net of taxes: E+F+G.  To compute the 
incidence, one simply compares the increase in consumer prices (PT –P0) to the amount of the tax to 
get the consumer share. 
But now think of a world in which there are many potential markets such as the one presented 
in figure 1.  They have different sizes and before the firm can produce in the market, it must first 
decide whether to enter at all.  If it does so, the firm must pay some fixed cost FC.  Without a tax, a 
firm will enter if the producer surplus in the market, C+D+F+G, exceeds FC.  After the tax, though, 
the potential producer surplus in the market is just B+C.  So long as B+C stays greater than FC, the 
firm still enters the market and the conventional tax calculation is correct.  Wherever C+D+F+G > FC 
> B+C, however, the tax reduces producer surplus enough to prevent entry.   
                                                                                                                                                         
papers relate mainly to dial-up Internet access so are less relevant to the issue of rolling out broadband. 
4 At the time of this sample, residential broadband was provided almost exclusively by local cable monopolies.  
Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) show that for almost all realistic levels of demand growth that providers might The DWL from the tax in those markets equals the entire producer and consumer surplus.  
This certainly has the potential to be large, since the entire surplus in a market usually dwarfs a 
traditional DWL triangle, but the practical importance of this kind of efficiency cost depends entirely 
on the actual magnitude of the fixed costs and the number of places that might be on the margin of 
being bypassed.  This paper will use the case of broadband at an early point in its diffusion to 
illustrate that, in practice, the idea may be quite important indeed. 
  The incidence of the tax in figure 1 will also be changed.  Rather than compute the consumer 
share of the burden as the change to after tax prices relative to the size of the tax, as in the standard 
approach, one ought to also account for the losses in markets that are bypassed just because of the tax. 
 To the extent that new goods generate large consumer surplus but only modest producer surplus (in 
excess of the fixed costs), the incidence will tend to be borne significantly more by consumers than in 
the typical estimate. 
 
3. Industry Background and Data on the Demand for Broadband 
A. Broadband and Cable Modems  
  Broadband, and specifically cable modems allow Internet users to receive data from the 
Internet over their fiber-optic cable line rather than over conventional telephone wires.  This allows 
the user to access the web at speeds up to 100 times faster than standard dial-up modems. At the time 
of this sample broadband accounted for only 2-3 percent of online users (Mines, et al., 1998; Strategis 
Group, 1999), but was growing rapidly.  The subscriber base grew from less than 40,000 in 1996 to 
about 750,000 by mid-1999, and analysts at the time forecast that by 2002 or 2003, the number of 
broadband users could range between 4 million and 27 million (Mines et. al, 1998; Kinetic Strategies, 
1999; Kasrel et al., 1999; CATC CyberLab, 2000; Gillett and Lehr, 2000).  The actual number in 
2002 was 20 million (C.B.O., 2004).   
                                                                                                                                                         
have made at the time, there would be oligopoly at the least. Although the major current residential competitor to cable modems is DSL, a service 
provided over telephone lines, at the time of this sample residential DSL had extremely limited 
availability (see Gillett and Lehr, 2000).  Indeed, even now, cable modems continue to have a 
dominant market share of residential customers.  At the time of the sample in this paper, cable 
modems were widely regarded as the superior consumer choice (PC World, 1999).  For purposes of 
analyzing the broadband entry decision circa late 1998/early 1999, the local cable monopoly can be 
viewed as, effectively, having a local monopoly on residential broadband access.  The typical fee for 
broadband access through a cable modem at the time of the survey was about $40 per month.  
  In considering the cost structure of the cable modem industry, it is important to note that the 
standard marginal cost in the sense of the cost of providing an additional minute of access, is close to 
zero.  The marginal costs facing the system are best thought of as marginal costs per customer rather 
than per minute.  Fixed costs, in this setting, will be costs that are shared across customers in the same 
metropolitan area.  For a cable company to provide service in an area, they must incur the fixed cost 
of entering the market and then a one time marginal cost for each household that signs up for the 
service.  From those subscribers, then, the cable company receives a flow of revenue.  For simplicity, 
I will sometimes compute this as a lump-sum NPV equivalent assuming that the cable company has a 
10 percent discount rate and expects to have the customer for five years at current prices, after which 
time the cable company gets nothing—either new technology makes the current cable modems 
obsolete or new competitors drive profits to zero.  The choice of discount rate and customer life 
makes virtually no difference to the main results.     
In practice, the marginal costs of adding a customer include the installation and upgrade of 
the coaxial cable "drop" to the individual home, at least some part of the customer acquisition costs, 
customer premises equipment (cable modem, etc.), and whatever expected maintenance might be 
required.  In total, JP Morgan (2001) estimates this to be between $600 and $1200 in 2001.  Gillett 
(1995) suggest that just the engineering cost side was likely to be greater than $2000 in 1995.  Owen (1999) and Carriere (2001) also report costs somewhere between these estimates.  So these per 
customer costs could be considerable at the time of the sample in late 1998. 
The fixed costs include all costs shared over multiple customers in the same market including 
upgrading the shared cable line to be two-way and digital, upgrading the head-end electronics, the 
costs of extensive marketing efforts, the costs of establishing and operating a new type of billing and a 
customer care center, among others (though some of these costs would be incurred anyway if a cable 
system upgraded to digital in order to compete with satellite, as I will discuss later).  The size of these 
fixed costs can be quite substantial and they are the reason that cable providers do not offer cable 
modem service to any customer willing to pay for the marginal costs of hooking up their individual 
home.  They must get a large enough group of subscribers to make it worthwhile to enter a market.  
These fixed costs are the key to understanding the impact of taxation in an innovative industry. 
There may be some costs that are not marginal in the sense of being per customer but nor are 
they fixed across the entire city.  Cable companies might have fixed costs at a smaller level than city-
wide, for example, if they were going to upgrade part of their local networks or something like that.  
In this sense, the most accurate model might be to look at markets at the neighborhood level rather 
than at the city level.  Practically speaking, the data are not sufficient to allow a more detailed 
geographic analysis.  That said, many of the fixed costs will be at a broader level than the 
neighborhood and in most urban areas, upgrading the network involves the expensive digging up of 
the street to get to the cable lines.  There are some definite economies of scale to doing such work 
simultaneously rather than piece by piece.  It is also expensive to have part of the network being 
modern and part being antiquated so companies tend to upgrade most everything at one time.  A 
general piece of evidence supporting the idea of fixed costs at a broader level than just the 
neighborhood is that although there were some pilot programs testing broadband in limited areas, 
cable companies in large markets typically offered service to a large number of areas and they did not 
offer any service in smaller metro areas even if there were small pockets of potential highly educated, high-income customers. Indeed, outside of the top 50 metro areas, virtually no company offered 
residential broadband whatsoever. 
 
B. Data 
To estimate the impact of taxes in this market, I combine several sources of data.  The 
availability of cable modems at the time of the survey (late 1998) comes from PC World (1999).  It is 
important to note that entry at that time was less dramatic than today.  When cable companies 
introduced capacity, take-up rates were typically very low—around 3-5%.  While it would be 
preferable to model the entry into smaller geographic units than the metropolitan area, the data do not 
allow it.   
Next, I match the PC World data to individual level data on people’s willingness to pay for 
broadband as given in the surveys of Forrester’s Technographics 1999 program.  Forrester is a leading 
market research company which studies the information economy.  Each year it conducts a survey of 
close to 100,000 people about their usage of various products as well as demographic information.  
More detail on the Forrester survey can be found in Bernhoff et al. (1998).  The precise question 
involved asks how much the consumer would be willing to pay (in dollars per month) for high-speed 
Internet access up to 100 times faster than on conventional modems.  Their answers are of the form 
“Less than $5”, “$5-$15”, “$15-25”, and so on, up to “$65+.”  Summing these individual demand 
curves in each of the top 69 metro areas gives market level demand curves even for markets where 
there is no broadband access yet.  These 69 areas account for approximately 75% of the U.S. 
population.  I will use only people reporting reservation prices of at least $15 per month to keep those 
people with reservation prices far from the equilibrium prices from influencing the shape of the 
estimated demand curve. 
Although these demand curves are not based on transactions data, such transaction data has 
limited value for calculating consumer surplus.  One wants to know the area under the entire demand curve and transaction data estimate the demand curve only in places near the equilibrium.  One 
typically extrapolates a functional form out to the price axis to make the welfare calculation.  Here, 
rather than assume a functional form from the demand around the equilibrium points, the demand 
curve will take the functional directly from the respondents' stated preferences.  To verify that the 
stated preferences also match the observed transaction data in the range surrounding actually observed 
prices I will present several independent pieces of confirmatory evidence.   
 C. The Demand Curves 
  As an example of the market level demand curves, Figure 2 presents the results from the San 
Francisco metropolitan area.  There are 69 such curves: one for each market.  Price per month is on 
the vertical axis and the number of respondents who would purchase broadband at that price is on the 
horizontal axis.  As there are 1,680 respondents from the Bay area and 2.4 million households in that 
market, each respondent represents about 1410 households (Nielsen, 1999).  
  For each of the markets, I then fit a quadratic inverse demand curve to the data and use that 
equation for the tax analysis.
5  There was no qualitative difference for the results from using a log 
linear demand curve and capping reservation prices at the highest reported level or from using a 
piecewise linear demand curve.
6  The demand curve estimated for the San Francisco metro area, for 
example is  
    P = 57.15  - .2814 Q  +  .00044 Q
2  + e 
          (5.63)   (.0839)       (.00019)                 R
2=.90, n=6   
 
                                                 
5  These demand estimates will not include prices of dial-up Internet service.  Although this would seem to be an 
important substitute for broadband, the data do not bear this out.  In independent merger cases where they 
evaluated the evidence on the subject, both the Department of Justice and the FCC have ruled that the two are 
separate markets (FCC, 2001; U.S. Department of Justice, 2001).  Using micro data, Rappoport et. al (2001) 
estimate the cross-price elasticity of broadband demand with respect to dial-up price and find it to be miniscule 
(elasticity of broadband only 0.02).  
6 I will use the quadratic rather than the piecewise linear because it is easier to deal with and because a standard 
result from the public finance literature is that the incidence of a tax on a monopolist with a linear demand curve 
is split evenly between the producer and the consumer.  Since incidence is one of the main topics of interest, I did 
not want to impose linearity.  In a previous version of this paper, I also checked the robustness of this functional 
form by allowing for a log-linear demand curve with a cap on the valuations at the highest stated price.  The basic 
findings about DWL and incidence were the same in that case. At the market price of about $40 per month, the elasticity of demand in San Francisco is -
2.65.  The elasticities at that price are listed for all of the markets in the first column of table 1.  They 
range from -2.15 to -3.76 with an average of around -2.75.  The R
2  in every equation was quite high.
7  
Several things suggest that these demand curves match well to contemporaneous estimates of 
broadband elasticities using transaction data.  The price elasticity of demand for high bandwidth in 
the Berkeley INDEX randomized experiments was generally between -2 and -3.  Kridel et al. (2000) 
use cross-city variation in prices to estimate an elasticity of demand for broadband and find it to be 
about -1.8 at a price of $49.95.  A previous version of this paper used the price differences for 
broadband between cable television subscribers and non-cable television subscribers to identify the 
price elasticity of subscribing to broadband (in markets where it was available at the time of the 
survey, of course), while controlling for extensive household level demographics.  Depending on the 
specification, the elasticity ranged from -2.8 to -3.5.    
In addition, the reservation price data suggest that among Internet users who live in places 
without cable modem access, about 4.7% would be willing to pay more than $35 per month and about 
2.0% more than $45 per month for broadband access.   The actual take-up rates in the data in the areas 
that did have access (where prices were about $40 per month) was about 2.2% and the take-up rate 
among those actually having the ability to get access computed in other sources was somewhere 
between about 3 and 5% (see Kinetic Strategies,1999 and Gillett and Lehr, 1999).   
The match also works well by education level.  The share of people in the Forrester data with 
only a High School education who claim they would pay $45 or more for broadband was 1.4% 
compared and 3.8% at $35.  Kridel et al (2000) show that the actual take-up rate among people with a 
high-school diploma was comfortably in between at around 2.5%.  For people with some college 
education, 2.5% say they would be willing to buy at $45 and 6.0% at $35.  The actual was around 4%. 
    
                                                 
7 To save space, the tables do not list the coefficients separately for all 69 regressions.  These are available from Income tabulations also show similarity.  In the Forrester data, the share of  people earning 
$75,000 or more who would buy at $45 was 2.8% and at $35 was 6.3%.  In the transaction data, 
where the market price was in between those two levels, the actual adoption rate was 5.5%.  For 
people earning $45-75,000, 1.9% would buy at $45 and 4.8% at $35.  The actual data put the take-up 
at 3.2%.  Given the rather tight match of these results with the ones using transaction price data, I will 
take the reservation price information in the survey data as accurate.   
 
4. Equilibrium and a Conventional Tax Analysis 
From these demand curves, if all the top 69 markets in the United States had broadband 
access at the time of the sample, aggregate demand in late 1998 would be about 1.6 million 
households.  The market price for each market comes from assuming the local cable monopolies have 
constant marginal cost and price in a Bertrand manner according to the standard monopoly mark-up 
formula.  The average elasticity in markets that actually had cable modem access at the time of the 
sample was -2.75 and the average actual market price was approximately $40.  This implies a MC of 
about $25 per month or $300 on an annualized basis.  This is in the same ballpark as the actual per-
customer costs described in Owen (1999) and very close to the cost estimates in Carriere et al. (2000). 
 I will assume it to be equal across markets.  
Given this marginal cost, the quadratic inverse demand curves imply a marginal revenue 
function in each market.  Setting the two equal yields the quantity sold and plugging into the demand 
curve yields the market price.  In the calculations here, the projected market prices across areas form a 
relatively tight band around $39.50 per month.  This prediction comports well with reality in that 
there was not much actual variation in prices of existing broadband services across markets at the time 
of the sample. 
    The consumer surplus and producer surplus in each market, as derived from the estimates, are 
                                                                                                                                                         
the author upon request. listed in the second and third columns of Table 1.
 8  There are 69 but the table lists only the top 50 
markets to save space.  Summed across all the markets, the total consumer surplus adds up to about 
$955 million per year (restricting to only those markets that actually had service at the time of the 
survey, the total was $667 million).  
Using this demand and cost set up, a standard tax analysis is straightforward.  Although the 
Internet Tax Freedom Act forbid the states from applying sales tax to internet access, we can explore 
the impact of a tax of that magnitude in these data.  The median state sales tax at the time was 5% 
which would correspond to something like a $2 per month tax on a $40 per month service.  To avoid 
any complications associated with the differences between ad valorem and specific taxation, let us 
consider the simplest form of the tax, a $2 per month Internet access tax paid by the cable company 
which is the equivalent of raising the marginal cost from $25 to $27 per month.  Solving for the 
equilibrium in each market, this would raise the average equilibrium price to $40.60 from $39.50 
(differently in each market, of course).  The share of the tax born by consumers in different locations 
ranges from 50 to 60%.  After the tax, the total quantity summed across all the markets falls from 1.63 
million to 1.51 million.  The total revenue raised from the tax ($2 per month for every customer) 
yields an annual revenue of about $36 million.  The new consumer surplus falls by about $80 million 
to $875 million per year and producer surplus falls about $20 million to $250 million.  The net $64 
million drop in social surplus is the deadweight loss and it amounts to more than 180% of the revenue 
raised by the tax.  This large efficiency cost arises because of the large elasticity of demand at 
equilibrium prices. 
 
5. Fixed Costs and Adjusting the Tax Analysis to Account for Technology Diffusion 
  This was not a conventional market, however.  It was a rapidly growing one where most 
communities did not yet have access.  With fixed costs of entering a market the conventional 
                                                 
8 To get the numbers into comparable units, I will weight each city by the average number of households per approach can miss a great deal.  Looking at the producer surpluses in table 1, it is clear that they vary 
greatly across locations depending on the elasticity of demand and the size of the market.  The largest 
potential producer surplus—New York City with $23.2 million—is much larger than the median 
market's producer surplus, for example, of only about $2.5 million.  With fixed costs of entering a 
market, the chances the cable company will wait to rollout service until demand grows further are 
high.  At the time of the sample more than 90% of markets with producer surplus in the top 20 had 
access to broadband while less than 30% of markets ranked 50 and below did.
9  This is certainly 
suggestive evidence that fixed costs played an important role in the diffusion of the product.  If the 
fixed costs were only at the neighborhood level, for example, then the diffusion pattern would tend to 
be small roll outs into the high-income, highly educated neighborhoods in all markets rather than 
more extensive rollouts in large markets and no service in the small ones.  
 
A. Estimating the Size of the Fixed Cost 
  To estimate the fixed cost of serving a market, table 2 lists the results from probit regressions 
of whether the metro area had access to cable modems at the time of the survey as a function of the 
producer surplus.  This treats the entry as a binary variable at the market level for two reasons.  First, 
the share of people with the service seem relatively similar across markets that have access so it seems 
like the size of entry must be fairly similar (relative to the overall market size).  Second, the data do 
not allow more detailed geographic analysis of the entry.  With this in mind, there were a few metro 
area where cable modems were available in only one small neighborhood or as part of a limited pilot 
program—i.e., not generally of the same size as the more general entry locations.  I do not count these 
as entry in the Probit because in such circumstances the provider would not yet have incurred the 
                                                                                                                                                         
survey respondent (about 1220 on average). 
9 I restrict the sample to the top 69 metro areas so as to have enough observations to estimate the demand curves 
in each one and because in these markets almost none of the population lacks access to cable the way some 
people do in very rural areas.  The principle holds even more so in the markets below this top 69 group, however, 
since virtually none of them had access to broadband at the time of the sample. major city-wide fixed costs mentioned above.   
  The cable modem providers were, effectively, monopoly providers of residential broadband 
(recall that DSL was hardly available in any location at the time) so the regression will, arguably, not 
require adjustments for strategic behavior as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990; 1994) or Berry (1994).  A 
direct measure of the fixed cost of entering the market can be computed by just dividing the constant 
term by the coefficient on producer surplus (since it is a cost, it is a negative number).  This measure 
gives the dollar value of producer surplus past which the probit index is greater than zero.  In other 
words, it indicates how high the annual producer surplus needs to be in a market before they are 
predicted to have broadband.  The first column uses only the measure of consumer surplus and the 
constant term in the regression.  The imputation predicts about 75 percent of markets correctly (about 
5 percent of the time a market did not have access when the model predicted it would and 20 percent 
of the time a market had access but was predicted not to).  The value of the fixed cost here is the same 
in every market.  It suggests that entry does not occur until the annual producer surplus exceeds about 
$3.4 million per year.
 10  This would correspond to a fixed cost of about $16.4 million in NPV terms at 
the discount rate and customer life discussed above.  So a market needed to generate as much surplus 
as somewhere like Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania or Austin, Texas to warrant entry in 1998. 
  Columns 2 and 3 of the table allow a more nuanced estimate of the fixed costs by allowing for 
reasonable variation in costs across locations.  Column 2 recognizes that higher population density 
could reduce the costs of rolling out broadband in a market and could reduce the fixed cost of entry.  
By adding population density (as measured by Census Bureau, 1996) to the regression, the 
specification asks what level of producer surplus is needed to justify entry but allows the level to be 
lower if the market is highly concentrated.  In the data, however, the density variable itself is 
                                                 
10 Of course the absolute value of the fixed cost depends on the assumptions in the NPV of revenue calculation.  
The calculation of which cities are on the margin, however, and the additional DWL in those cities relative to the 
conventional will not be affected by that choice because they are computed as a share of revenue.  Changing the 
NPV assumptions will adjust the implied producer surplus, implied fixed cost and future tax revenue by the same 
proportion.  completely insignificant, small, and of the wrong sign.  Column 3 repeats the same exercise but uses 
the growth rate of population in the metro area in the preceding decade, since a location with the same 
current producer surplus but a higher growth rate of population might lead the cable company to incur 
the fixed cost and enter the market.  Here the variable is the correct sign and is of more consequence 
but the coefficient is only borderline significant.  That said, this does generate a range of implied 
fixed costs across markets.  They range from cities needing current annual producer surplus of only 
$2.1 million to warrant entry in markets at the 90th percentile of population growth to almost $5 
million at the 10th percentile.  Whether one uses the fixed costs from column 1 or column 3 will not 
change the results, as demonstrated below.  I also tried variables that might influence the demand or 
cost of upgrading the cable lines such as the mean education in the market or the share of people in 
the market who subscribe to satellite television.  More education is typically associated with faster 
adoption rates for new technology (Goolsbee and Klenow, 2002).  Competition from Direct Broadcast 
Satellite services like DirecTV, which are digital and have very high picture quality, was viewed by 
many as forcing the most threatened cable systems to upgrade their networks irrespective of the 
demand for broadband (see the discussion in Goolsbee and Petrin, 2004).  When a company upgrades 
its system, it is much cheaper to provide broadband service as an additional feature.  Neither of these 
factors had any significant effect on the observed deployment rates, however.  The results indicate 
that there is somewhat robust evidence that there some important fixed costs facing the providers of 
residential broadband. 
 
B. Computing the Actual Deadweight Loss from Taxing New Technology 
  If the fixed cost of entry to a market is the size indicated above, the standard analysis of 
taxation will be highly misleading.  The conventional analysis of taxation is only accurate in markets 
where producer surplus after taxes is sufficient to cover the fixed cost (or in places where they have already entered).
11  These markets together account for about 46% of the U.S. population.  Similarly, 
there is no problem in the smallest markets since the tax on broadband access has no effect of any 
kind in places where entry would not occur regardless of the tax rate.   
  In the middle markets, however, the impact of taxes on diffusion makes a big difference.  In 
these estimates, there were four market where the producer surplus with no tax on access would 
warrant entry but the surplus with a tax on access would not warrant entry.  These were Miami, 
Cleveland, Tampa, and Milwaukee.  If the government had put a tax on broadband (and did so before 
diffusion took place) the firms would delay entering.  In the interim, all of the consumer surplus and 
producer surplus (but minus the fixed cost of entry) in these markets will become deadweight loss 
from the tax.
12  
At least in this case, that adjustment makes a big difference.  In the 19 markets served both 
before and after the imposition of the tax (where the conventional tax analysis is completely correct), 
the sum total of DWL from the tax is $43 million per year and the revenue is $23 million per year.  In 
just the four markets where entry is delayed because of the tax, however, the DWL arising from lost 
consumer surplus is $56 million—greater than the DWL in the 19 'normal' markets combined.  The 
lost producer surplus (minus the fixed costs) adds an additional DWL of $14 million.  Thus the 
deadweight loss adjustment associated with the impact of taxes on diffusion, $70 million, exceeds the 
conventional deadweight loss by a factor of 2 (raising the total DWL from around 180 percent of 
revenue to 434 percent of revenue).  
This finding of dramatically higher DWL from taxation is robust to how one defines the 
marginal markets.  Above, the analysis relied on the hard {0,1} entry cutoff and counted only four 
markets as being delayed for certain and the ones above the threshold as having broadband for certain. 
 Using, instead, the continuous variable of the predicted probability of entry from the Probit 
                                                 
11 Though the producers must now subtract off the fixed cost of entry in each market when computing their total 
profit, of course. 
12 This is similar to the argument made in Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) and Owen and Rosston (1998) that regression and recomputing the DWL and revenue for each market and summing across markets, 
weighting by that probability before and after the imposition of a tax, the total DWL as a share of 
revenue was even higher at 515%.  Accounting for the fact that some markets might be growing faster 
than others and might induce entry even if the 1998 level seemed insufficient by using the results 
from the modified entry probits and repeating the same analysis yielded a smaller (but still 
dramatically larger than in a conventional analysis) DWL of 346% of revenue. 
  
C. The Actual Incidence of Taxing Broadband 
  The conventional analysis does not just understate the DWL of taxing new goods.  In terms of 
incidence, it also significantly understates the share of the tax ultimately borne by consumers.  
Typically, the share of the tax borne by consumers is calculated by comparing the pre-tax to the post-
tax consumer price.  This will completely miss the problem arising in the bypassed markets.  In those 
places, consumers bear a large burden from taxation since they lose all of their consumer surplus even 
though the tax collects no revenue.  They are invisible because the tax shuts the market down.  This 
will disproportionately hurt consumers because in the marginal markets, almost by definition, the 
suppliers were close to indifferent between entering and incurring the fixed cost and choosing not 
entering.  The tax leads producers to lose a small amount by choosing to delay entry and forgoing the 
small net profit from the market but leads the customers to lose a great deal because of the lost 
consumer surplus.
13 
  In the case of broadband, the overall burden of the tax calculated the conventional way shows 
that the average price before tax went from $39.50 to $40.60, suggesting that consumers pay about 55 
percent of the $2 tax.  Accounting for the bypassed markets, however, the total burden of taxation on 
                                                                                                                                                         
forcing universal access to cable modems could slow deployment in medium sized markets. 
13 I am indebted to Don Fullerton for pointing out that this argument arises because the monopolist is not able to 
perfectly price discriminate.  If the monopolist could do so, they would capture all the consumer surplus in the 
market and would, therefore, internalize the impact that their decision to bypass a market has on the small 
number of high valuation customers. producers and consumers (equal to revenue paid plus the lost consumer and producer surplus minus 
fixed costs) is $136 million on an annual basis.  Of that $136 million, 70 percent ($93m) is borne by 
the consumers.  The standard calculation understates the consumer share substantially because it 
disregards the large losses to consumers in the markets where entry gets delayed.
14   
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper argues that the deadweight loss from taxing a new technology that has fixed costs 
associated with adoption can be much higher than taxing a conventional good because it can lead to a 
delay in adoption and a subsequent loss of consumer and producer surplus.  The paper uses empirical 
evidence on the market for broadband at an early stage of its development as an empirical illustration 
that the conventional DWL calculation of a tax can, in practice, understate efficiency losses from 
taxation by a factor of 2-3 and understate the share of the tax burden borne by consumers by 15 
percentage points.  Given the importance attached to new goods in recent work in industrial 
organization and macroeconomics, the findings in this paper suggest that taking into account the 
impact of taxes on innovation and technology may be fundamental for understanding the role of 
government policy in the new economy.
                                                 
14 This also raises the possibility that a subsidy (negative tax) could generate an overall welfare gain to society if 
it increased consumer surplus in markets where it induced entry by enough to outweigh the normal DWL.  See 
Goolsbee (2002) for a discussion.    
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    Source: Number of survey respondents who would buy broadband at a given  
      price per month.  Computed as detailed in the text.  
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Source: Estimates from a quadratic demand curve for each market.  These are the top 50 markets, the next 19 
markets are excluded to conserve space but are included in the estimates.  The elasticity is calculated at a price of 
$40 per month.  The producer and consumer surplus calculations are computed as described in the text.  
TABLE 2: Does the Market Have Cable Modem Access in 1998 

































































Notes: The dependent variable in each Probit is whether or not the metro area had general 
access to broadband in 1998.  The producer surplus is calculated as described in the text.  The 
measures of population density and the population growth rate come from the U.S. Census.  
The implied fixed cost is calculated in NPV terms assuming a discount rate of 10% and a 
customer life of five years.  
 